Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name:  Giovanna Bimonte
Author-Email:  gbimonte@unisa.it
Author-Workplace-Name: Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Università degli Studi di Salerno
Title:  A General Coalition Structure: Some Equivalence Results
Abstract:  TThe formation of coalition may imply some theoretical difficulties, such as costs arising from forming a coalition or sharing information among agents. In this paper we will assume that only a subset S of the set of all possible coalitions in an economy is the set of admissible coalitions. We define the S-core concept, as in Hervs-Moreno. We will extend to a model with both uncertainty and asymmetric informations the results showed in Okuda and Shitovitz.
Creation-Date: 2013-12
Publication-Status: Published in Working Papers, July 2014, pages 1-12
File-URL:http://www.dises.unisa.it/RePEc/sep/wpaper/3_230.pdf
File-Format:Application/pdf
File-Function:First version, 2013
Number:3_230
Classification-JEL: D51; D82; D11
Keywords:Differential information economy, restriction on coalition formation, private core.
Handle:RePEc:sep:wpaper:3_230